The Military is Subordinate to the Constitution, not to personal power

 

SDC News One | Legal & Political Analysis

The Military is Subordinate to the Constitution, not to personal power



Michael Popok breaks down the criminal statute that Trump tried to use -- 18 USC 2387 -- and explains how Trump has failed against 6 other Democrats as well.-khs


APACHE JUNCTION AZ [IFS] -- There is a growing pattern in Washington that deserves closer scrutiny — not just for what it says about one political figure, but for what it reveals about the guardrails of American democracy.

In public speeches, former President Donald Trump often adopts the language of dominance and absolute authority. The rhetoric is sweeping. The tone is defiant. Critics are portrayed not merely as political opponents, but as enemies of the state. Yet when those words collide with legal reality — courtrooms, grand juries, constitutional thresholds — the outcomes tell a more complicated story.

The latest example centers on reported efforts to pursue charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2387, a rarely used federal statute concerning interference with military service or attempts to cause insubordination or disloyalty within the armed forces.

What Is 18 U.S.C. § 2387?

The statute makes it a crime to:

  • Willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the armed forces.

  • Obstruct recruitment or enlistment.

  • Encourage resistance to lawful military authority.

This law dates back to the early 20th century, largely associated with wartime contexts and serious efforts to undermine military cohesion. Historically, prosecutions under this statute are extremely rare — and when they occur, they require clear evidence of intent to disrupt lawful military authority.

That legal distinction matters.

The Core Issue

The controversy reportedly involved six members of Congress — vocal critics of Trump — who publicly reminded members of the military that their oath is to the Constitution, not to any individual leader. That statement, by itself, echoes a foundational principle of American civil-military relations.

Every member of the U.S. Armed Forces swears:

“I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic…”

They do not swear allegiance to a president. That is by design.

When a grand jury reportedly declined to indict, it signaled something important: political speech reminding service members of their constitutional oath does not automatically cross into criminal incitement under federal law.

Grand juries require probable cause — a relatively low threshold. If that standard cannot be met, it suggests the legal theory itself may have been weak.

A Pattern of Legal Friction

Observers point out that this is not the first instance in which aggressive legal framing against Democratic lawmakers has failed to advance. Attempts to stretch criminal statutes into political disputes face constitutional headwinds — particularly the First Amendment.

Speech by elected officials on matters of public concern receives the highest level of constitutional protection. To criminalize such speech requires proof of direct incitement, intent, and likely unlawful action — standards shaped by Supreme Court precedent, including Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), which protects speech unless it is directed to inciting imminent lawless action and likely to produce it.

Simply reminding military personnel of their constitutional obligations does not, on its face, meet that test.

Public Rhetoric vs. Institutional Limits

This moment underscores a broader dynamic in American governance:

  • Political rhetoric can be expansive.

  • Executive influence can be powerful.

  • But prosecutorial decisions still require evidence.

  • Grand juries operate independently.

  • Courts apply constitutional standards.

That tension — between political messaging and legal proof — is where democratic systems are stress-tested.

Critics argue that even unsuccessful prosecutions can have a chilling effect, forcing public officials to defend themselves against criminal accusations for speech. Supporters of strong executive authority argue that national security statutes must remain available when genuine threats arise.

The constitutional question remains the same: Where is the line between political disagreement and criminal conduct?

The Larger Democratic Principle

At the heart of this dispute is a fundamental American doctrine: civilian control of the military is subordinate to the Constitution, not to personal power.

The Founders were explicit in their fears of concentrated authority. That is why:

  • Congress declares war.

  • The President serves as Commander-in-Chief.

  • Courts interpret constitutional limits.

  • Military officers swear loyalty to the Constitution, not an individual.

When political conflicts spill into the criminal code, institutions become the referee.

In this case, the grand jury appears to have made its decision. The reported move to drop the case reinforces the reality that legal mechanisms cannot simply be repurposed as political weapons without meeting statutory and constitutional standards.

The Broader Takeaway

Strong rhetoric may energize a base. But in a constitutional republic, speeches do not equal indictments — and indictments do not equal convictions.

The American system was designed with friction. It slows things down. It forces evidence. It requires proof. It demands intent.

And sometimes, despite loud declarations, it simply says: no.

For now, this episode stands as another example of how the separation of powers and constitutional protections continue to shape — and limit — political confrontation in the United States.

This is SDC News One. 

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